The next Administration will have an opportunity to reshape the image America presents to the world. This requires leveraging so-called U.S. soft power instruments. Foreign assistance is one of the tools. However, American public opinion is highly skeptical of the benefits of economic aid to foreign countries. In general, foreign assistance is a low priority. Only 18% of the public considers improving the standards of living (e.g. getting out of poverty) of less developed nations as very important, 64% want to cut back economic aid and only 8% want to expand it. Furthermore, there is little consensus and much controversy among researchers and academics on the impact of foreign aid on reducing poverty or creating economic opportunity and growth.
Against this context the HELP Commission, after taking nearly two years examining reform options for US foreign assistance programs, released its much anticipated final report, "Beyond Assistance." The Commission was created by an 
Act of Congress spearheaded by Congressman Wolf (R-VA) in January 2004. Most notable statement in the report after 22 months of countless meetings interviews and study:
“…. not one person appeared before this Commission to defend the status quo. It is shocking that the need for foreign aid reform is so widely recognized yet so little has been done to implement lasting and vital changes. The legislation mandating the U.S. system was written more than 45 years ago and is littered with competing goals, conflicting objectives, and vague directives.”
Specific recommendations put forth by the Commission, included:
· consolidating the disarray of organizations, purposes and accounts of assistance;
· rewriting the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to establish a new compact on foreign assistance;
· enhancing policy coherence, particularly by aligning U.S. trade and development policies;
· increasing resources -- staff, management training, and budget -- for foreign aid;
· ring-fencing long-term development assistance from redirection to short-term security and policy needs;
· encouraging greater investment in economic growth, agriculture and infrastructure programs;
· removing trade restrictions that hamper development, including reducing U.S. agricultural subsidies and providing duty-free/quota-free access for Millennium Challenge Account countries and for countries with $2000 per capita GDP;
· reestablishing an independent Office of Monitoring and Evaluation to track performance and report results; and
· instituting a Quadrennial Development and Humanitarian Assistance Review.
The Commission did not reach consensus on the organizational structure to manage a reformed foreign aid strategy. A majority supported a "super State Department" with four functional under secretaries -- political and security affairs; economic affairs, development and trade; humanitarian services and stabilization; and public diplomacy and consular affairs. A minority report by three commissioners argued for a cabinet-level department for international development.
New R&D Institute Proposed
Among the more intriguing recommendations is to establish a research and development organization to jumpstart technology that will change people’s lives in the developing world. Technology is increasingly becoming a part of daily life even in poor countries. The scientific and innovative capacity of developing states is also growing and partnerships with US high tech companies is clearly accelerating in such areas as biotechnology, climate research, alternative energy, biofuels, information technology, communications, infrastructure development, environmental health, education and so on. . . For example, Nick Negroponte has been promoting the One Laptop per Child (OLPC) program, a low cost computer specifically designed for developing countries. Intel has the Classmate PC designed for emerging markets worldwide.
The organization suggested by the HELP Commission would be called the “Development Applications Research Institute” (DARI), modeled on DARPA and focus on building technology in all relevant development areas, including agriculture, health and education. Excerpts from the report:
“…… Like DARPA, it would take on long-term projects and welcome risk-taking, with the understanding that risk taking implies potential losses as well as gains. In addition, much of the organization’s work would be carried out in partnership with the developing countries themselves, as a way to spur the development of local R&D capabilities and to ensure that local expertise informs solutions destined for local use…..the head of DARI could serve as science advisor to the lead U.S. Government official in charge of development policy. At the same time, staff could proactively seek new ideas for funding from private enterprise and research universities to ensure the broadest range of inputs……DARI would only fund projects that would lead to practical application of technology by poor people in the developing world. America needs to build a successful new R&D organization that is devoted to development. The cost would be relatively small, on the order of $50 to $100 million a year, but DARI could transform countless lives. Its cost is easily justified by solving a “market failure.” In other words, private markets probably have not responded to these needs because of the anticipated small market and low expected private return. However, these are outweighed by the high expected social return. DARI also could help alleviate suffering around the world and restore our country’s reputation for leadership in innovation.”
Some links to similar efforts that launched during the life span of the HELP Commission-- Brookings/CSIS' Security By Other Means, CSIS's Smart Power Commission, the Center for U.S. Global Engagement's Impact '08, and Senator Lugar's Committee Staff Report, Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid -- as well as CGD's Commission on Weak States and National Security that preceded it.
The framework organizes indicators in four broad domains as illustrated and into 14 specific factors that drive knowledge from original insight to economic impact. Based on a detailed evaluation of these indicators and a workshop we identified a set of baseline indicators from which to evolve innovation vital signs for the national innovation ecosystem. We conclude that currently available indicators and measurement methods do not adequately describe in a timely manner the dynamics of innovation today. Innovation cannot be approached as an isolated inventive activity and linear process. We need to move beyond indicators dominated by inputs such as R&D, scientific and engineering personnel, patents and number of publications. A comprehensive indicator framework is required that can link innovation inputs, processes and outcomes to better reflect the reality of innovation today. Innovation is best viewed an ecosystem of relationships, connections and diverse patterns interaction among individuals and organizations. It is a complex process in which new knowledge eventually becomes embedded into a new products, services, processes and business models that create value. This value creation process in turn generates national benefits and revenue and profit to entities who undertake the risk of being innovators. 
